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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
 
Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international
trends and events and their policy implications. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the authors’ own and
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
China’s rising assertiveness and uncertainties about America’s response 
to it are causing middle powers in Indo-Pacific Asia to look beyond 
traditional approaches to security. India, Australia, Japan and some 
ASEAN countries are expanding security cooperation with each other. 
The next step should be the creation of ‘middle power coalitions’: 
informal arrangements where regional players cooperate with one 
another on strategic issues, working in self-selecting groups that do not 
include China or the United States. 
Areas of cooperation could include security dialogues, intelligence 
exchanges, military capacity building, technology sharing, agenda 
setting for regional forums and coordinated diplomatic initiatives to 
influence both US and Chinese strategic calculations. This would build 
regional resilience against the vagaries of US-China relations, including 
against the extremes either of conflict or collusion. It would also reinforce 
the multipolar quality of the emerging Indo-Pacific order, encouraging 
continued US engagement without unduly provoking China. With their 
leaders due to meet soon, India and Australia are well placed to form the 
core of this middle power coalition building. 
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Until recently it was widely hoped that a combination of economic 
interdependence and regional institutions would mitigate great power 
rivalry and all but eliminate the possibility of major interstate conflict in 
Asia. 1 This hope, however, now seems forlorn. In particular, countries in 
the region are increasingly concerned about the risky trajectory of US-
China relations. This is in turn bringing into question traditional 
approaches to regional security, whether it be dependence on US 
alliances, multilateral frameworks or non-alignment. 2   
Asian countries that until just a few years ago were willing to bet on 
China’s peaceful rise are now preparing to hedge in the face of China’s 
increasingly coercive behaviour against Japan, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. To insulate themselves from the risks of strategic competition 
or collusion between China and the United States, Asia’s diverse 
‘powers in the middle’ – including India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and other ASEAN countries – are adopting a range 
of strategies. Strikingly, these nations are looking beyond formal regional 
multilateral institutions, alliance with the United States, and traditional 
postures of non-alignment to cooperate with each other.3 
Where could and should this lead? Mutual assistance among the Indo-
Pacific’s middle players should expand, and should not be limited to 
bilateral cooperation. A logical extension of this would be the creation of 
Indo-Pacific ‘middle power coalitions’: informal arrangements where the 
powers in the middle make it a priority to strengthen and help one 
another, working in self-selecting groups, or ‘minilateral’ arrangements 
that do not include China or the United States. Areas of cooperation 
could include security dialogues, intelligence exchanges, military 
capacity building, technology sharing, agenda setting for regional 
forums, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives to influence both US and 
Chinese strategic calculations. This would build regional resilience 
against the vagaries of the US-China relationship, including against the 
extremes either of conflict or collaboration. It would also reinforce the 
multipolar quality of the emerging Indo-Pacific order, encouraging 
continued US engagement without unduly provoking China by creating 
the impression of US-led encirclement.  
This Lowy Institute Analysis examines the prospects for flexible middle 
power coalitions in Indo-Pacific Asia.4 It begins by reviewing the 
changing security dynamic in Asia and the potential trajectories of the 
US-China relationship, many of which could harm the interests of the 
powers in the middle. It explores the rapidly expanding security 
cooperation among those middle players, and identifies the prospects, 
problems and priorities for building durable middle power coalitions.  
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It concludes by focusing on two powers, Australia and India, explaining 
why their growing security relationship could form a core of middle power 
coalition building in the region. India’s new prime minister Narendra Modi 
is due to visit Australia in November 2014 for the G20 Summit, and it is 
expected that Australian prime minister Tony Abbott will visit India before 
then, probably at the start of September.5 The next few months thus 
offer an ideal window for the two leaders to strengthen their countries’ 
bilateral security cooperation and begin joint efforts towards minilateral 
cooperation with other regional powers in Asia.  
 
STRATEGIC CHANGE IN ASIA 
After decades of stability under unchallenged US dominance, the Asian 
strategic order is changing and uncertain. This has been driven by the 
rise of China as a great power, perceptions of US relative decline, and 
the ways in which other Asian nations are responding to both. China’s 
economic growth, its increases in military spending, and the extension of 
China’s interests and reach across the wider region have been key 
features of this changing strategic landscape. More recently, the region 
has seen growing evidence of Beijing’s willingness to challenge aspects 
of the status quo, notably with regards to maritime claims. 
Disputes over maritime territory, resource rights, history and nationalism 
have worsened between China and several neighbours, notably Japan, 
Vietnam and the Philippines. Security mistrust has persisted also 
between China and India, including over their contested border, and in 
light of China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In response 
to these tensions, regional countries are modernising their defence 
capabilities and, where possible, deepening their ties with the United 
States.    
For its part, the United States has moved to reassure allies and partners. 
Since 2011, the so-called ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ strategy has involved a 
mix of diplomatic, military and economic initiatives aimed at shoring up 
America’s strategic investment in Asia. The pivot is not purely about 
balancing against China’s growing power in order to reassure allies and 
deter destabilising actions. Yet that is a substantial part of its intent. 
Three years on, the pivot remains open to doubts and criticism.6 The 
pivot has fallen victim to US defence budget cuts, domestic political 
paralysis, and misgivings in a growing part of the American public about 
maintaining their country’s global security leadership. Diplomatically, it 
has been undermined by uneven US participation in high-level Asian 
forums. There is little sense of large-scale reinforcement of the US 
military presence. Existing US military capabilities in Asia are formidable, 
but stretched.7  
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There are also questions about Washington’s appetite for risk. The 
Pentagon has said it is prepared to “project power in areas in which our 
access and freedom to operate are challenged”, implying a greater 
willingness to place forces at risk in Asia than in the past.8 Yet it is 
difficult to square this with the nagging sense, fed by US hesitancy over 
Syria, Iraq and Ukraine, that the Obama Administration would prefer to 
lead from behind. In these circumstances, many Asian countries are 
increasingly concerned about the shape of the region’s security future 
and are considering what they can do.  
 
ASIAN SECURITY FUTURES  
It is clear that the US-China relationship will be at the centre of Asia’s 
security future. But there are many ways in which relations between the 
United States and China could evolve. Most do not bode well for the 
ability of the powers in the middle to protect and advance their interests. 
A range of possibilities, outlined below, illuminate the challenges and 
choices they face.   
Obviously the most devastating − if unlikely − outcome of Asia’s 
uncertain security future would be a worsening of current tensions 
leading to a major war between the United States and China. The 
catalyst for this could be a conflict between China and one of its maritime 
neighbours – notably US allies Japan or the Philippines – in which the 
United States becomes militarily involved in support of its ally. Or it could 
be renewed Taiwan tensions, the chaotic aftermath of regime collapse in 
North Korea, or a spark or scenario not yet possible to envisage. There 
would probably be multiple points at which major war could be averted 
by leaders’-level diplomacy. But there is no guarantee that either 
diplomacy or economic interdependence could stop conflict from 
beginning or escalating. The 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the 
First World War is a reminder that seemingly localised security shocks 
can have unpredictable and devastating consequences. A US-China war 
would wreak immense damage on all countries’ interests, even were 
hostilities to cease well before the nuclear threshold. 
Another harmful but less catastrophic outcome would be a Cold War 
between the United States and China. A prolonged era of intense 
near-war confrontation would likely see Beijing and Washington insisting 
that smaller powers take sides, militarily, economically and 
diplomatically. Some observers suggest that the region is already 
moving in this direction and that the rhetoric at recent security forums 
has already taken on this tone.9 Again, were such a situation to 
eventuate, the interests of the powers in the middle would be 
subordinated to Chinese and US priorities and risk-taking, even if initially 
some of them – notably Vietnam and the Philippines – might welcome 
strong US pushback against China. 
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Other scenarios short of conflict also bode poorly for the interests and 
freedom of action of the region’s powers in the middle. One is the 
prospect of a Sino-centric Asian order. Many scholars, and not only in 
China, have argued that there is something natural about Asia being 
reorganised around Chinese primacy. If China’s rise and America’s 
relative decline continue along the present lines, it is not difficult to 
imagine a regional order eventually dominated by Beijing.10 The United 
States would seek to prevent such an outcome, as would many 
countries in Indo-Pacific Asia, notably Japan, India, South Korea, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia, although there are no guarantees 
they would be successful.  
Another possibility is the reinforcement of American primacy. This 
would require a slowdown in economic growth or internal instability in 
China, or a dramatic revival in America’s economy and political will. It 
would also need the maintenance of America’s military edge and the 
strengthening of its traditional alliances and new partnerships.11 While 
many of the powers in the middle would welcome the continuation or 
restoration of the old order, they cannot afford to base their security 
policies on that uncertain prospect. Their strategic planners have to treat 
it as a possible outcome, not a probable one. 
One broad set of possible futures involves some form of 
accommodation between the United States and China, an approach 
advocated by some prominent voices in the Australian public debate, 
notably Hugh White.12 At the moment, a comprehensive accommodation 
of China’s interests seems far from a likely choice by a United States 
stung by Chinese maritime assertiveness and economic espionage. It 
was not long ago, however, that the first Obama Administration signalled 
its willingness to look for ways to accommodate at least some of the 
interests of a rising China, provided it was willing to play by (US-led) 
international rules.13 Some in Asia worried that this attempt to offer 
strategic reassurance to China would be at the expense of their own 
interests. However, Beijing, rejected Washington’s overtures, probably 
seeing them as a sign of weakness, and soon thereafter proceeded to 
display a new assertiveness at sea and in diplomatic forums. This 
weakened the case in America for a strategy based on accommodation 
with China, and instead pushed US policy in the direction of the pivot. 
Still, some leading figures in the US strategic community, such as Henry 
Kissinger, continue to warn that a confrontation with China would be 
disastrous for America and insist there is no alternative to “cooperation 
and co-evolution”.14 For its part, in light of the US pivot to Asia, the new 
Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping has called for an undefined “new 
type of great power relationship” between Beijing and Washington.15 Any 
Chinese misgivings about an accommodation, in the form of a Sino-
American condominium or ‘G-2’, are less about the principle than its 
terms.  
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Accommodation could take a variety of forms. One possibility is that the 
two powers agree to spheres of influence. Much like Spain and 
Portugal agreed not to compete at the dawn of the colonial era, some 
analysts suggest that the United States and China could demarcate 
areas of primary interest in which they would not contest each other’s 
leadership. A more inclusive version of accommodation would see the 
construction of an Asian ‘concert of powers’, perhaps including China, 
the United States, Japan and India.16 Another variant of accommodation 
is the idea of the United States shifting to an ‘offshore balancing’ role, 
involving a marked diminution of its military presence and day-to-day 
diplomatic activism in East Asia.17 
In theory, it would seem normal and acceptable for a rising power’s 
interests to be accommodated. The realities of the current Indo-Pacific 
strategic situation, however, mean that an effort at accommodation 
would bring major risks and uncertainties: accommodation would itself 
be destabilising. Any form of accommodation between the dominant 
power, the United States, and the rising challenger, China, would involve 
Washington ceding additional space and role for Beijing in the 
management of the regional order. This would have been welcome if 
Beijing’s neighbours were politically comfortable with China’s rise. Today 
they are not. For those in Asia with significant concerns about how 
Beijing might use its growing power, American support or legitimisation 
of a larger Chinese role would create strategic anxieties.  
It is difficult to imagine a large and workable Chinese sphere of influence 
in Asia that did not challenge the interests, security and dignity of other 
substantial countries, such as Japan, India or Vietnam, and was not 
accordingly resisted by them. To concede control of the South China 
Sea as part of a Chinese sphere of influence would be to concede “more 
than is compatible with the vital interests of other great powers”.18 
Although the concert of powers idea might seem acceptable to Japan 
and India, it is not clear why China would accept an arrangement where 
it was outnumbered three to one by the United States, a US ally (Japan), 
and a strategic competitor (India). Offshore balancing, meanwhile, is 
prone to the tyranny of geography. If the United States is already 
cautious about making shows of force against coercion in an Asia where 
it maintains strategic presence, it is difficult to envisage it returning 
forcefully to the region in all but a catastrophic scenario – at which point 
it would lack the capability advantages, such as in maritime surveillance, 
that only ‘being there’ can provide.    
A more attractive possibility for the region’s future would be not so much 
accommodation but incorporation: an increasingly powerful China taking 
its place as a constructive player in strengthened regional institutions. 
The region would make some adjustment to China’s growing interests 
provided that China – and America – accepted that truly inclusive 
regional organisations became the principal platform for managing 
security differences. This would involve concessions from both powers to 
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allow inclusive regional bodies like the East Asia Summit (EAS), centred 
on ASEAN, to have a major say in managing key tensions that touched 
on those powers’ interests. But this path is presently little more than 
theoretical: it looks very unlikely. Even the mere construction of such 
institutions has been bedevilled by competition between the powers. 
China, having failed to exclude the United States, India and Australia 
from the EAS, instead tries to stop this institution from addressing 
sensitive matters such as the South China Sea. 
 
MIDDLE POWERS, MIDDLE PLAYERS 
As the United States and China redefine their relationship, Asia’s middle 
powers will be left to navigate this uncertain security future. There is no 
reason, however, why they should be passive players in this process: 
they have the potential to influence the evolution of relations between the 
two giants.19 But if they are to do this, it is clear that they will need to 
move beyond their existing approaches to regional security and work 
much more closely with each other. 
The idea of middle power diplomacy – typically involving the building of 
coalitions in multilateral forums – has considerable lineage, especially in 
Australia and Canada.20 More recently it has, to varying degrees, been 
identified as relevant to many countries in Indo-Pacific Asia.21 It makes 
sense to understand Australia, South Korea and the more militarily and 
diplomatically capable Southeast Asian countries – Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Singapore – as middle powers. Even Japan22 and India23 can 
plausibly be defined as middle powers for the time being, given their 
internal challenges and the limits of their capacity to shape the strategic 
environment unilaterally. 
Working together, Asia’s middle powers could affect the regional balance 
of power. They have their own kind of strength in numbers, if only they 
can coordinate their capacities better. For instance, as of 2013, four of 
the region’s middle powers, Japan, India, Indonesia and Australia, had a 
combined population of 1.64 billion, a combined GDP of US$ 9.13 
trillion, and combined defence expenditure of US$ 127.80 billion. By 
contrast, the US has a population of 316.5 million, a GDP of US$ 16.78 
trillion and defence spending of US$ 640.21 billion. For its part, China's 
population was 1.36 billion, its economy US$ 9.18 trillion and its defence 
budget US$ 188.46 billion respectively.24  
At the moment, Asia’s middle powers pursue three main types of broad 
security strategy. Some have made the alliance with the United States 
the cornerstone of their approach. Others have put their faith in 
multilateral or regional approaches; others in various forms of non-
alignment. The utility of each of these approaches is likely to be tested 
by the evolving security future of Asia. 
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RELIANCE ON THE UNITED STATES  
China’s rising power is testing American alliances. Thanks to the rapid 
advances in its military capabilities, Beijing is probing the durability of 
American strategic primacy in the Western Pacific. Although the United 
States is a bigger military power in global terms, and its technological 
edge will likely endure for many years, Beijing has begun to alter the 
regional military balance. If Chinese force modernisation continues 
apace it will eventually tilt the US-China bilateral military balance in the 
Western Pacific in Beijing’s favour. This will undermine the credibility of 
US alliances and more broadly raise doubts about Washington’s ability 
to forestall Chinese pre-eminence in Asia. 
China’s neighbours see a US policy establishment divided on the 
question of coping with Beijing’s rise. Despite Washington’s assurances, 
many Asian nations worry about the constancy of American purpose in 
Asia. For example, the Obama Administration has moved from seeking a 
degree of accommodation with China to announcing a high-profile pivot 
to Asia and then a seeming de-emphasis of the rebalance strategy – all 
in the past six years. Asians also worry about the combination of 
America’s continuing preoccupation with the Middle East, the breakdown 
of post-Cold War understandings with Russia, hints of renewed 
isolationism and an increasingly dysfunctional domestic polity in 
Washington. All of this will make the United States a less predictable 
variable in the Asian power calculus. This in turn means that Asia will not 
only have to hedge against China’s rise but also against prospects of 
America’s relative decline and inattention.  
Against this backdrop, both the United States and its allies are looking to 
diversify their security partnerships. For decades the United States had 
relied on formal bilateral alliances and special relationships in Asia. Now 
Washington is broadening the base in multiple ways. Even as it 
strengthens traditional alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, 
Philippines, Thailand) and long-standing partnerships (Singapore), 
Washington is seeking to deepen defence relationships with India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Washington is also encouraging its 
allies to work with each other.  
The past few years have brought a rapid expansion of bilateral security 
cooperation agreements across Asia. US allies and partners are 
expanding their own bilateral defence ties with each other as well as 
third parties.25 Consider, for example, Japan’s growing defence 
engagement with Australia, India and the ASEAN nations, involving high-
level dialogue, information sharing, capacity building and defence 
exports. Tokyo’s security partnership with Canberra now appears poised 
for a significant expansion following prime ministerial visits in both 
directions in May and July 2014. Some observers suggest Japan is 
seeking a quasi-alliance commitment from Australia, while Canberra 
appears interested in the option of acquiring Japan’s advanced 
submarine technology.26 
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Since the middle of the last decade, when Japan announced the launch 
of a strategic partnership with India, security cooperation between the 
two has grown to cover a range of activities including regular military 
exercises and combined ‘2+2’ talks among senior foreign and defence 
ministry officials. The two sides are also exploring industrial 
collaboration, beginning with transfer and production in India of a 
Japanese amphibious aircraft. While progress will necessarily be slow, 
thanks to cautious bureaucracies in both capitals, there appears to be a 
rare alignment of political stars with the return of Shinzo Abe as Japan’s 
prime minister and the 2014 election of Narendra Modi with a strong 
mandate. In the last few years, Japan has also devoted special attention 
to developing defence and security cooperation with Southeast Asian 
countries, notably Vietnam and the Philippines. Japan has also stepped 
up its activism in the various ASEAN forums.  
Another US ally, South Korea, has traditionally focused on its alliance 
with the United States and the security threats from the North, yet it too 
has made defence cooperation a major priority for its engagement with 
other countries in Asia. Although Seoul’s current relations with Tokyo are 
strained, it has expanded its defence diplomacy with Australia, India and 
some Southeast Asian countries, notably Indonesia, and is seeking to 
combine this with defence technology links. 
In much of this cross-cutting alliance diplomacy, Australia has been a 
quiet leader, beginning with its 2007 bilateral security declaration with 
Japan, and a similar subsequent statement with India in 2009. Australia 
has also worked to deepen practical security cooperation and dialogue 
with Southeast Asian partners, including Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam and, despite recent ructions over espionage and 
illegal immigration, its close neighbour Indonesia. Australia has become 
a venue of choice for multilateral defence exercises, such as the first 
naval drills of the 18-country institution known as the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting Plus, conducted in October 2013. Canberra’s defence 
policy documents highlight such engagement as a way to influence the 
regional security environment and manage risks of conflict.27 
No US ally sees its new regional partnerships as a substitute for an 
alliance with America but rather as a useful complement. In fact, 
America’s own quest to build new defence partnerships in the region has 
made it easier for allies to do the same. This widening of the network of 
defence cooperation has also included trilateral arrangements. Notable 
among these are the Australia-US-Japan trilateral security dialogue – 
which has translated into military exercises and the building of 
interoperability – and a more modest India-Japan-US trilateral dialogue, 
as well as the frequent involvement of Japanese warships in India-US 
‘Malabar’ exercises.  
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MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES 
Those regional middle powers that have placed their faith in multilateral 
or regional mechanisms to provide for their security are also being 
forced to look beyond such approaches by the strategic changes 
underway in Asia. Indonesia’s experience with ASEAN is a case in point. 
It has long been a point of faith for ASEAN to mitigate great power 
tensions in Asia by drawing all powers into a cooperative security 
mechanism under its aegis. The reality is that the very construction of 
regional institutions has fallen prey to conflicts between regional powers. 
The 2005 formation of the East Asia Summit centred on ASEAN, 
underlines this. China first pushed for an EAS based on the ASEAN+3 
process that excluded India, Australia and the United States. Most of 
ASEAN preferred to ensure that those countries, plus Russia, were 
present in the EAS to broaden the playing field and dilute Chinese 
influence. Thus, since then, Beijing’s emphasis has been on limiting the 
scope of the EAS and refusing to let it touch China’s pursuit of its 
interests, trying to block it from discussing the South China Sea.  
Neither the older institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (foreign 
ministers level) nor the newer ones like the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus (which brings together the defence ministers of the EAS 
member states) are likely to be effective in coping with the historic 
redistribution of power in Asia. Their focus on soft security issues only 
underlines an inability to address real problems. Beijing has also shown 
the ability to use proxies such as Cambodia to break ASEAN unity on 
issues involving disputes between its member states and China.28 There 
have been suggestions from Beijing of a “new Asian security concept” 
that somehow downplays the current regional institutions and seeks an 
end to US alliances in the region. Speaking at a hitherto little-known 
forum called the Conference on Confidence Building and Interaction 
(CICA), Chinese president Xi Jinping declared that Beijing would build it 
up as the main multilateral security body for the region.29 The implication 
was that China would marginalise the EAS and other ASEAN-centric 
institutions, even though CICA does not include Japan, Indonesia and 
the Philippines, among others, as full members. 
 
NON-ALIGNMENT 
The changing regional scenario is also encouraging Asia’s non-aligned 
countries to discard their traditional military isolationism and expand 
security cooperation with their fellow Asian countries and the United 
States. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union were distant powers. It was relatively easy to stake out a neutral 
or non-aligned position between them. Dealing with US-China rivalry 
poses more difficult challenges for the large non-aligned countries in the 
region such as India and Indonesia. That China is an Asian power gives 
Beijing the advantage of emphasising inherited regional traditions of 
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Asian solidarity and opposition to Western dominance, appealing to 
sections of some Asian political elites. Yet this card has its limits. The 
slogan ‘Asia for Asians’ has less appeal now that many of China’s 
neighbours see a threat to their interests emanating from China rather 
than from former colonial powers. Those countries facing territorial 
claims from China – Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and India – have no 
difficulty seeing through Beijing’s recent rhetoric about a new framework 
for Asian security.  
The governments of Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam have become 
increasingly explicit in warning about the risks they see in Chinese 
power. In most other regional countries however, especially those with 
traditions of non-alignment, there remains a reluctance to be forthright 
about such questions, amid significant domestic opposition to any 
arrangement that would look like an alliance with Washington to balance 
Beijing. That said, expanding defence cooperation with America short of 
a formal alliance has become an important objective of states such as 
India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.   
These countries are conscious, however, that they cannot rely on the 
United States alone to guarantee their security. Expanding defence 
cooperation with other regional powers has, therefore, become a major 
feature of regional security politics. India, which limited its defence 
engagement with even closest partners such as the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War, has significantly expanded defence partnerships with a range 
of countries over the last decade and more.30 The rise of China and its 
growing military profile in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean have 
intensified India’s quest to consolidate its traditional security partnerships 
in the region as well as build new ones. If India’s new defence diplomacy 
has little resemblance to the past politics of non-alignment, the situation 
is similar with other countries like Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar, 
which are all discarding postcolonial military isolationism.  
 
TOWARDS MIDDLE POWER COALITIONS 
So far these moves by Asian middle powers to look beyond their 
traditional approaches to security have been fairly tentative, limited to 
bilateral or at best trilateral arrangements. Middle powers are looking to 
one another and sensing the possibility of safety in numbers. So what 
might be their next move? A logical next step would be to begin building 
flexible middle power coalitions, to explore ways of harnessing the 
convergent interests and substantial capabilities of India, Australia, 
Japan, Indonesia and other nations in between.  
Of course, the suggestion of a new coalition would immediately raise 
questions about whether Asia needs yet another security arrangement to 
add to its alphabet soup of underperforming organisations and initiatives. 
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Talk of a middle power coalition would also raise questions about 
whether and why it should be an exclusive bloc: who is in, who is out? 
Moreover, certain middle powers would be more comfortable working 
with some than with others. So instead of a formal arrangement or a 
single all-encompassing initiative, the aim should be for regional powers 
to build on their recent bilateral achievements in security diplomacy and 
to move towards multiple defence cooperation arrangements involving 
three or more powers. 
The idea is not to seek a single new forum that will replace either the 
alliances or the current ASEAN-led institutions. Rather, the model should 
be an array of overlapping coalitions that seek to improve the national 
security of their members through flexible partnerships defined by 
geography, capabilities, interests or shared functional objectives. These 
would be loose, self-selected ‘minilateral’ arrangements of capable 
middle players. Importantly, they would include neither China nor the 
United States.  
These coalitions would not of themselves resolve the region’s security 
dilemmas, but could be a valuable instrument to help participating 
countries advance and protect their interests while coping with change. 
They would provide an extra measure of insurance against some of the 
chief risks in the US-China relationship: potential US-China confrontation 
or conflict, Chinese hegemony, or an accommodation between 
Washington and Beijing at the expense of the rest of the region. 
Provided they were shaped intelligently, middle power coalitions could 
build regional resilience and insulation against the vagaries of the US-
China relationship, without unduly provoking China or undermining US 
engagement. 
It should be acknowledged that, initially at least, the United States would 
be more likely than China to see these developments as favourable to its 
interests. After all, the United States has encouraged greater regional 
security cooperation among its allies and non-aligned Asian partners. 
China is likely to be more suspicious, perhaps seeing such coalitions as 
an extension of US strategy rather than what they principally would be: 
prudent mutual help among regional states seeking to increase their 
ability to provide for their own and common security. This problem of 
perception is not a reason to abstain from careful coalition building; 
rather, it is a risk that regional powers can manage. 
One way to address Chinese suspicions would be for these coalitions to 
present shared views to both Beijing and Washington on ways to reduce 
or manage security differences. At the same time, the coalitions could 
produce ready-made groupings of countries to engage with China in 
multilateral security activities, such as providing counter-piracy, search 
and rescue, and other public goods. Moreover, such coalitions could not 
be dismissed by China as ‘containment’, especially if they are not led by 
the United States. In this sense, middle power coalitions that do not 
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include Washington could also help neutralise attitudes of reflexive anti-
Americanism or Chinese-cultivated pan-Asianism within some regional 
countries.  
Arguing for middle power coalitions is not the same as arguing for formal 
alliances among middle powers. It remains unrealistic at this stage to 
envisage coalition members taking on great strategic risk themselves to 
directly assist one another in a confrontation or conflict, such as a clash 
with China, in the absence of a lead role from the United States. For 
instance, it is difficult to imagine India being willing to assist Japan with 
military force were it to find itself at war with China over disputed islands, 
given that India has its own border tensions and economic ties with 
China to worry about. For the foreseeable future, a coalition would be 
highly unlikely to have the political solidarity or resolve to balance 
against Chinese power in a conflict without the support of the United 
States. And even if such resolve could be found, the combined material 
capacities of a combination of regional powers minus the United States – 
say Japan and India plus several others – would not be a match for 
China. 
 
WHAT WOULD THE COALITIONS DO? 
So far, the efforts of Indo-Pacific middle powers to build security relations 
with one another have been modest and bilateral, or managed in three-
way partnerships involving the United States. A shift towards middle 
power coalitions, however informal, would be a step change. What, 
conceivably and realistically, could middle power coalitions do? Here are 
some possibilities. 
Political consultations: This would occur first, including at leaders’ 
level. Much of the current generation of regional leaders, notably three 
conservative leaders, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, Japanese 
prime minister Shinzo Abe, and Australia prime minister Tony Abbott, 
have sufficient power domestically to be able to drive and sustain bold 
new foreign policy departures. They would be in a position to direct their 
diplomatic and defence establishments towards serious cooperation.  
Diplomatic coordination: Next would come closer coordination by 
officials on emerging regional issues. An emphasis by these coalitions 
on the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for the Law of 
the Sea, and the right to secure freedom of navigation would help press 
ASEAN to be bolder and push the United States to remain purposeful 
against Chinese maritime assertiveness. At the same time, united 
diplomatic fronts by middle powers could help moderate China’s 
behaviour by making it clear to Beijing – and domestic audiences in 
China – that their efforts reflect the will of the region rather than some 
American design. Visible diplomatic cooperation among Asian middle 
…united diplomatic fronts 
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powers would counter Beijing’s ‘Asia for Asians’ stratagem. The 
coordination activities could be expanded to include the creation of 
caucuses in regional and global meetings, from the East Asia Summit 
and other ASEAN-centric bodies to the G20 and United Nations forums, 
to mobilise on an issue-by-issue basis. 
Intelligence exchanges: Given the vastness of the Indo-Pacific region, 
few if any regional intelligence establishments have a complete picture 
of its rapidly evolving geopolitical dynamics. Of special importance would 
be the exchange of military intelligence, especially in the maritime 
domain. Generating shared maritime domain awareness should be a 
major priority. This could begin in sub-regions, for instance India- 
Australia-Indonesia maritime surveillance cooperation in their contiguous 
waters of the north-eastern Indian Ocean, encompassing critical sea 
lanes. There may even be scope in time for some of the middle powers 
to share their intelligence-gathering capabilities or facilities, although this 
would need to factor in sensitivities about sharing of intelligence provided 
to some of these partners by the United States. Still, no one state – 
including the United States – is in a position to monitor the vast Indo-
Pacific littoral alone. So new cooperative endeavours in this field are 
worth exploring, and these could also help allay mistrust on intelligence 
issues among some middle powers, such as Australia and Indonesia.  
Military exercises: India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Singapore 
already conduct a wide array of bilateral exercises with one another and 
other partners, from disaster relief through to some instances of high-
end operational training. These could expand, both in scope and 
participation, as a step towards operational cooperation. These could be 
focused around the provision of regional ‘public goods’ through 
cooperation on counter-piracy activities, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, 
search and rescue, and the prevention of illegal activities at sea. India, 
Japan and Australia already participate in international peace and 
stability operations of various kinds. The three countries could do more 
to share their experiences and create an institutional framework for 
future cooperation in such operations. These three maritime powers 
could form an effective core for engaging with other partners on a case-
by-case basis, including China as its navy becomes more active in the 
Indian Ocean. 
Interoperability: As India encounters the projection of Chinese naval 
power, it will likely become more open to developing interoperability with 
partners, a concept it has traditionally resisted. If Indian wariness of 
working closely with the US Navy continues, it may be politically easier 
for it instead to build coalitions with such powers as Australia, Japan, 
Vietnam and Indonesia. India and its coalition partners could pursue 
agreements for logistical cooperation, replenishment access to each 
other’s bases and island territories, and status of forces agreements that 
might better prepare all participants to respond to emerging maritime 
challenges. There are precedents. Despite India’s strategic autonomy, 
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Singapore for example has had access to Indian military facilities for 
over a decade.   
Technology sharing and transfer: This might include the coordinated 
acquisition, production or maintenance of some military systems. Given 
the complexities of weapons procurement and development in each 
Indo-Pacific middle player – with India the most glaring example – this 
may seem unrealistically ambitious. But signs of change are evident. For 
example, India, Australia and Japan are all acquiring P-8 long-range 
maritime surveillance aircraft. India, which has long experience in 
operating Kilo Class submarines, is helping Vietnam to manage its 
acquisition of the same from Russia. India is negotiating the purchase 
and coproduction of US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan. Canberra is 
reportedly showing an interest in Japanese submarine technology, and 
eventual Indian interest in this is also conceivable. In the short term, 
multi-nation collaboration on patrol boat production and purchases would 
be feasible, and partnerships in sonar technology development are 
another prospect worth investigating. The improving quality of defence 
production in Asia, particularly in Japan and South Korea, and those 
countries’ increased interest in export potential provide a reason for 
partner states to consider diversifying beyond established European and 
US industry links. This dynamic will intensify with the expanding role of 
the private sector in India’s defence industry, which is already well 
underway in shipbuilding.  
Capacity building: Several of the proposed Indo-Pacific partners, 
notably Australia, India and Japan, have assisted other countries in the 
region improve their security capabilities, from maritime forces to 
counter-terrorism. Greater coordination of this work could reduce 
duplication and help states such as Indonesia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines improve their capacity to provide for their own security and 
become security providers in turn. Such capacity building could include 
training or the transfer of capabilities, such as a recent deal for Japan to 
provide patrol boats to Vietnam. 
 
CORE STRENGTH: AUSTRALIA AND INDIA 
Just as multiple middle power coalitions are possible in Asia, there are 
many ways for the process to begin. Multi-nation processes are difficult 
to mobilise, so a simple starting-point would involve growing from a 
successful bilateral process. One promising option would be to build 
upon the strategic partnership between India and Australia that has 
developed in recent years.31  
These two countries may seem an unlikely couple: two democracies 
very different in economic development, population and diplomatic 
traditions. Yet Delhi and Canberra have drawn much closer together 
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over the past decade as their strategic interests have converged around 
issues like maritime security, counter-terrorism and a regional order not 
dominated by any one power. As far back as 2001, these two nations 
were officially recognising each other as pillars of stability in a 
challenging region.32 They have overcome a Cold War history of mistrust 
and mutual indifference, surmounted differences over uranium exports, 
built economic and societal links, and are now poised for a deeper 
defence relationship including regular bilateral naval exercises and high-
level dialogue.33 
Together Australia and India could draw on their distinct and 
complementary strengths to initiate the construction of multiple, 
overlapping minilateral arrangements. They could be the Indo-Pacific 
core, not so much of one formal coalition, but of several flexible 
coalitions. These two powers have their own substantial capabilities, the 
benefits of their strategic geography, and most importantly the potential 
to engage and mobilise a wide range of partners between them: a mix of 
US allies and notionally non-aligned states. In all of this, India and 
Australia would be seeking to engage other regional states as equals, 
rather than insisting that others accept their formal ‘leadership’. They 
would be leaders only in the sense of being well positioned to get the 
coalition process underway. 
Between them, India and Australia would stand a good chance of 
involving Indonesia in a three-way security dialogue, and perhaps 
eventually a maritime surveillance regime focused on the approaches to 
the strategically vital Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar straits. 
India could use its ties with Vietnam, and Australia its long-standing 
defence links with Singapore and Malaysia, to encourage those states 
towards a more region-wide approach to security cooperation. Australia 
could for instance encourage the long-standing Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (involving Singapore, Malaysia, Britain and New Zealand) 
to work more closely with India or other regional states in exercises and 
training.  
Delhi and Canberra already have promising bilateral links with Japan 
and South Korea, which they could use to urge these two powers to 
focus on their common interests. Together, India and Australia could 
also encourage Tokyo to continue its defence ‘normalisation’ while 
helping it find ways to separate present policy from negative historical 
baggage. India and Australia would also be well placed to coordinate 
their middle power coalition with wider relationships, not only with China 
and the United States, but also extra-regional stakeholders such as the 
EU, France and Britain, which are looking for modest ways to contribute 
to stability in the Indo-Pacific.  
For Australia, such initiatives would fit well with Canberra’s efforts to 
deepen Asian security partnerships alongside the US alliance. They 
would reinforce the fact that Australia’s location and interests in the 
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emerging Indo-Pacific system make it an indispensable partner for 
security cooperation in the region. Questions about whether Australia is 
a truly ‘Asian’ security actor are well out of date. Moreover, a prominent 
role for Australia in Indo-Pacific coalitions that did not include the United 
States would confirm that a US alliance is an advantage or at least a 
complement, and not an obstacle, to Australia’s independent foreign and 
security policy in the region. 
For India, building Indo-Pacific coalitions of middle powers could well 
become a critical element of a strategy to cope with the power shift in 
Asia and the uncertain evolution of US-China relations. This would help 
Delhi relieve the tension in its policy between seeking to balance a rising 
China while avoiding an entangling alliance with the United States. 
Building middle power coalitions, as a complement to engaging China 
and deepening strategic partnership with America, would enjoy domestic 
political support while creating the basis for expanding India’s role in 
Asian security. The recently elected Modi government has a major 
opportunity here. Its election manifesto did not speak of non-alignment; it 
called for the creation of a “web of allies” to further India’s interests.34 
India’s strategic cooperation with the middle powers of Asia is likely to 
win greater domestic support than a strategy based mainly around 
partnership with the United States. It will also be less vulnerable to 
Chinese propaganda that regional security cooperation is nothing more 
than a part of Washington’s effort to contain Beijing. Such an approach 
will help Delhi break free of the tension between strategic balancing and 
the legacy of non-alignment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Even without a conscious articulation of strategy, most middle powers in 
Asia have begun to expand security cooperation among themselves. 
Confronted with the rise of China and its new assertiveness, and worried 
about the prospects of American relative decline and inconstancy of 
purpose, the middle powers are exploring avenues beyond traditional 
alliances, regional institutions or non-alignment. This quest is not a stark 
alternative to America’s alliances, continued engagement with China or 
efforts to support regional mechanisms. Instead, it is complementary, 
and increasingly important. The middle powers may not be ready for a 
single middle power coalition, but they are developing overlapping 
arrangements. Two powers, India and Australia, are now well placed to 
take the initiative and form the core of the emerging coalitions by building 
diplomatic and security cooperation between themselves and other 
partners including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. When they meet, the prime 
ministers of India and Australia will have an opportunity to influence their 
region’s strategic future. 
The recently elected 
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